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Abstract
The institutional quick fix may support the nation-state in the short run, but the underlying
logic of subsidiarty reduces the claim of rightful governance to a technocratic question of functional efficiency that will eventually undercut the nation-state’s claims to loyalty. In reaching this
conclusion, this Article first explores the origins and underpinnings of the doctrine of subsidiarity. Second, it examines the application of subsidiarity to the European Community. Finally, it
examines the compatibility of the principles developed with today’s understanding of sovereignty
in Western Europe.
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INTRODUCTION
The European Union' ("EU") has become a victim of its
own success. It has finally begun to realize some of the goals
intended by its founders, becoming an important actor in its
own right in both European and global politics. The iconic success of the "1992" initiative,2 followed closely by the Maastricht
Treaty and plans for even further integration in the immediate
future, have combined with dramatic shifts in the global order to
thrust the European Union into the limelight of European politics. The EU's development as an institution of primary importance to lawyers, bureaucrats, and political scientists, though, did
not adequately prepare it for the sudden transformation from an
institution of which the European public was more or less dimly
aware to the focal point of major policy debates.
Public suspicion of the EU's sudden prominence became
painfully obvious during national ratification of the Maastricht
* Clerk to the Hon.James B. Loken, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit;J.D.,
1994, M.A., 1994 (International Relations), Yale University; A.B., 1990, University of
Michigan.
1. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992) [hereinafter TEU] (amending the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I), as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATiES ESrABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNMES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987). The TEU, also known as the Maastricht
Treaty, officially adopted the name "European Union" for the former European Communities. TEU, supra, art. A.
2. SEA, supra note 1.
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Treaty. A referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark actually failed, British parliamentary support was questionable, and
even in traditionally pro-EC France a referendum passed by the
narrowest of margins.3
Suspicion of the EU tended to focus on two issues: the legitimacy of EU institutions themselves-the "democratic deficit"and the threat the EU posed to the independence and survival
of the member countries. I have discussed the democratic deficit at length elsewhere, and argued that supporters of the European Community advanced "technocratic" solutions that attempted to resolve problems of democratic legitimacy with marginal institutional adjustments rather than genuine efforts to
mobilize European publics and involve them in the Community.4 The same spirit of the institutional quick fix animates the
proposed solution to the tension between the EU and the survival of national polities and societies: the subsidiarity principle.
Subsidiarity is the latest buzzword of Euro-speak. The principle is laid out as follows in the Maastricht Treaty:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with
the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by
the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale
or effects of5the proposed action, be better achieved by the
Community.

The subsidiarity principle is designed to ensure that "decisions
are taken as closely as possible to the citizen."6 More broadly,
subsidiarity stands as the great limiting principle that will defend
national sovereignty against incursion by the ever-expanding
Brussels bureaucracy. It will assuage fears that the European
3.See, e.g., Half-Maastricht,ECONOMisT, Sept. 26, 1992, at 15 (discussing French
referendum); The Danes Say No, ECONOMIsT,June 6, 1992, at 10 (discussing failed Danish referendum); see also DAVID ARTER, THE PoLxrics OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE
TWENTiEmH CENTURY 212-16 (1993) (explaining turmoil surrounding ratification of
Maastricht Treaty).
4. Paul D. Marquardt, Deficit Reduction: Democracy, Technocracy, and Constitutionalism
in the European Union, 4 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 265 (1994).
5. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 3b, (1992]
C.M.L.R. 573, 590 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporatingchanges made by TEU, supra
note 1.
6. TEU, supra note 1, pmbl.
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Union seeks to obliterate national autonomy and identity.7
Or will it? Many commentators have questioned whether
subsidiarity will be an effective limiting principle in practice,
describing it in terms such as "weak, subjective, and openended. ' However, few have noted a subtler point: even if subsidiarity works exactly as intended, its principles are fundamentally corrosive to rather than supportive of the sovereignty of the
nation-state. The institutional quick fix may support the nationstate in the short run, but the underlying logic of subsidiarity
reduces the claim of rightful governance to a technocratic question of functional efficiency that will eventually undercut the naton-state's claims to loyalty. In reaching this conclusion, this Article first explores the origins and underpinnings of the doctrine
of subsidiarity. Second, it examines the application of subsidiarity to the European Community. Finally, it examines the
compatibility of the principles developed with today's understanding of sovereignty in Western Europe.
I.

THE ROOTS OF SUBSJDLARTTY

The notion that power should be allocated so as to favor
local control except where broader common interests
predominate is, at least in its implicit forms, an old one. It
seems, for example, to be an element of the design of many federal plans, including the U.S. Constitution.9 However, the principle was first explicitly enunciated as an aspect of Catholic social
doctrine.
In the 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, Pope Pius XI
laid out the principle of subsidiarity as follows:
Still, that most weighty principle, which cannot be set aside or
changed, remains fixed and unshaken in social philosophy:
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they
can accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it
7. George A. Bermann, Taking SubsidiarilySeriously: Federalismin the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 334 (1994); The Low Road to Edinburgh, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1992, at 48.
8. Frank Vibert, Europe's ConstitutionalDeficit, in JAMES M. BucHANAN E At., EuROPE'S CONSTITuTIONAL FurruPE 69, 80 (1990). Criticisms of subsidiarity will be discussed in Part III or this Article.
9. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
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to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the same
time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a
greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate
organizations can do. For every social activity ought of its very
of the
nature to furnish help [subsidium] to the members
10
them.
absorb
and
destroy
never
body social, and
Pius XI was primarily concerned with the relationship between
the individual and society, not between different levels of political organization. The encyclical, issued on the fortieth anniversary of Leo XIII's encyclical on workers' rights, was in large part
a response to the growing role of the modem state and to the
centralizing tendencies of capitalism and socialism." Rather
than drawing a sharp contrast between a private sphere of atomistic individuals and a public sphere controlled by the state,
Catholic social theory cast society as a complex web of family,
social, religious, and governmental ties with the ultimate goal of
encouraging and empowering the individual exercise of responsibility. Thus, the role of each level of social organization was to
facilitate independent action by the groups below it, in the end
supporting the maximum personal and spiritual development of
12
the individuals who are the ultimate base of all organizations.
In this system, subsidiarity served to reject claims of the state as
and t6 preserve the role of the
the focus of all public activity
3
church in the social order.'
Subsidiarity made the transition from a principle of social
organization to an explicitly political rule of institutional design
through German federalist thought. The word itself comes from
the German translation of QuadragesimoAnno, and that encycli4 German
cal was heavily influenced by the German church.
political thinkers seized upon the concept in the aftermath of
World War II, and transformed it from a social to a legal princi-

10. Pros XI, QUADRAGESiMO ANNO (1931), reprinted in THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS
1903-1939 415, § 79 (Claudia Carlen ed., 1990).
11. Andrew M. Greeley, What is Subsidiarity? A Voice from Sleepy Hollow, 153 AM. 292,
293-94 (1985).
12. Joseph A. Komonchak, Subsidiarity in the Church: The State of the Question, 48
JuIsT 298, 301 (1988).
13. Id
14. Marc Wilke & Helen Wallace, Subsidiarity. Approaches to Power-Sharing in
the European Community (1990) (Royal Inst. of Int'l Aff. Discussion Paper No. 27).
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Subsidiarity was a central idea in the reconstruction of the
political order in the Federal Republic and was a natural antithesis to the extreme centralizing tendencies of the Nazi regime.
Although the word itself does not appear in the German Basic
Law, the Federal Republic's assumption that all power flows
from the Lnder, and presumptively lies there unless explicitly
granted to the central authority, clearly was informed by subsidiarity. 16 The influence of the Catholic Church and of the German example made subsidiarity a staple of continental federalist
7
thought, especially among Christian Democratic parties.1
Given the importance of subsidiarity in contemporary European federalism, it is perhaps natural that the idea was picked up
and applied by enthusiasts of the European Communities. The
word appears in debates on EC reform as early as 1975.18 A committee led by Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans had the
task of re-evaluating the development of European political
union in light of the stagnation of the 1970's and proposing new
initiatives.' 9 The final report contained controversial recommendations for strengthening the independent European Commission, and the Commission's own submission to the committee discussed the principle of subsidiarity as a safeguard against
worries of over-expansion. 2 ° The Tindemans report had little
immediate effect, though, and it was much later that subsidiarity
made the transition from a historical footnote to an important
idea in EC political debate.
The first important force in revitalizing subsidiarity was the
15. Nicholas Emiliou, Subsidiarity: An Effective BarrierAgainst "The Enterprises of Arbition"2, 17 EUR. L. REv. 383, 385 (1992).
16. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution], art. 30 (Ger.) The exercise of governmental

powers and the discharge of governmental functions shall be incumbent on the Under
insofar as this Basic Law does not otherwise prescribe or permit. Emiliou, supra note
15, at 388-90.
17.

MICHAEL BURGESS, FEDERALISM AND EUROPEAN UNION 149-54 (1989).

18. Commission of the European Communities, Report on European Union, 8 E.C.
BULL, no. 6, at 6 (1975).
19. See generally DEREK W. URWrN, THE COMMUNITY OF EUROPE 218-20 (1991)
(describing historical context of Tindemans report).
20. Report on European Union, supra note 18, at 6; see Deborah Z. Cass, The Word that
Saves Maastricht? The Principleof Subsidiarity and the Division of Powers Within the European
Community, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1107, 1112 (1992) (discussing origins of subsidiarity); BuRGESS, supra note 17, at 86-92 (providing useful overview of circumstances
surrounding Tindemans Report on EC reform).
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European Parliament (or "EP"). The EP has long been the
weakest organ of the European Community, and has worked in
relative obscurity.2 1 In 1979, though, the European Community
replaced a system in which members of the European Parliament were appointed by their national governments with one of
direct popular elections. 2 2 The change energized the European
Parliament, boosted its visibility, and led it to push for further
institutional reforms. Any change emphasizing EC institutions
at the expense of Member States enhanced the power of the Parliament, whose institutional interests now lay firmly with the EC
rather than with national governments.
The European Parliament was also energized by the entry of
Altiero Spinelli as an Italian delegate. Spinelli had long been
one of the foremost federalist thinkers in the European Community. His vision for the Community was one in which the Community evolved into a new political superstructure supplanting
the existing nation-states through an explicitly political process
of transformation and centralization.23 The federalist view that
Spinelli championed stood in opposition to that ofJean Monnet,
who saw the future of European integration in a gradual growth
4
of European powers driven by practical considerations. In this
"neofunctionalist" view, the gradual implementation of cooperative measures would create pressures for even greater cooperation, both because of the positive example set by earlier initiatives and because increasing integration would create a greater
need for joint policy initiatives to achieve national goals. As national societies became more closely entwined, the growth of
practical ties and the experience of working together would in
the end5 lead to the evolution of a new pan-European political
2
society.
21. See, e.g.,Juliet Lodge, The EuropeanParliament-From'Assembly' to Co-Legislature,
in THE EuRoPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE FrruU 58, 58-61 (Juliet
Lodge ed., 1989); Shirley Williams, Sovereignty and Accountability in the European Community, in THE NEW EUROPEAN COMMUNrIY. DECISiONMAXING AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
155, 169 (Robert 0. Keohane & Stanley Hoffman eds., 1991).
22. NEIL NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLrrTcs OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrY
120-23 (1989).
23. For a thorough exposition of Spinelli's views and their contrast with Monnet's,
see BURGESS, supra note 17, at 43-63.
24. Monnet's fascinating career is further described inJEAN MoNNEr, THm PATH TO
EUROPEAN UNrry (Douglas Brinkley & Clifford Hackett eds., 1991).
25. Ernst Haas is generally credited with formalizing neofunctionalist analysis. See
ERNsT B. HAAs,THE UNITING OF EUROPE (1958); see also LEON N. LINDBERG & STUART A.
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Though Monnet's vision dominated the development of European institutions, Spinelli was able to use the European Parliament as a forum to promote his vision of a politically-driven federal Europe. The body of Euro-legislators was naturally receptive to his view of the primacy of politics. Buoyed by its newfound democratic legitimacy and a widespread sense of institutional crisis and opportunity brought about by the long "Eurosclerosis" of the 1970s, the Parliament began pushing for fundamental reform of the EC.2' The end result was the 1984 Draft
European Union Treaty ("Draft EUT") (not to be confused with
the Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht in 1992),
adopted at the urging of a group of legislators led by Spinelli.2 7
The Draft EUT was an ambitious document that would have
restructured the European Community to form something very
like a unitary federal state. In contrast to the previous gradual
evolution of EC powers, the Draft EUT explicitly reallocated a
broad range of political powers to the Member States, the
Union, or both concurrently. The principle of subsidiarity, a
cornerstone of continental federalism in fact if not in name, figured prominently in that division of authority. The definitions
of the European Parliament were slightly different from those
eventually adopted at Maastricht. The Union was to be entrusted "only with those powers required to complete successfully those tasks that they may carry out more satisfactorily than
the States acting independently."2 8 Furthermore, the Draft EUT
provided that "[t] he Union shall only act to carry out those tasks
which may be undertaken more effectively in common than by
the Member States acting separately, in particular those whose
execution requires action by the Union because their dimension
2
or effects extend beyond national frontiers." 1
At first glance, these allocations of power and principles of
decision closely resemble those found in the Maastricht proviSCHEINGOLD, REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THEORY AND RESEARCH (1971)

(comprehensive
survey of subject).
26. See BURGESS, supra note 17, at 162-73; Juliet Lodge, Institutional Provisions: Towards a ParliamentayDemocracy, in EUROPEAN UNION: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNn'Y IN

SEARCH OF A FUTURE 49-50 (Juliet Lodge ed., 1986).
27. Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, 1984 O.J. C77/33 [hereinafter
Draft EUT]; see BURGESS, supra note 17, at 162-73; EUROPEAN UNION: THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY IN SEARCH OF A FUTURE (Juliet Lodge ed., 1986).
28. Draft EUT, supra note 27, pmbl.
29. Id. art. 12.
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sion quoted at the beginning of this Article. However, the Draft
EUT lacks Maastricht's explicit presumption in favor of local authority; its version of subsidiarity is more a principle of rationality allocating power solely on the basis of efficiency. To draw a
domestic legal analogy, the burden of proof is different under
the European Parliament's formulation: there is no presumption that the smaller polity is the appropriate arena for action.
Spinelli made it clear that he so understood the provision: "The
transition from one sphere to the other is subject to the principle of subsidiarity in cases when an objective may be achieved
more effectively in common .... I shall not dwell here on the
special procedures and guarantees provided for to ensure the
transition to a higher level of unity."3" Thus, the function of the
principle was to promote centralization as much as to guard
against it.
When the debate on subsidiarity later was picked up by
other EC institutions, the European Parliament more clearly advanced this position. The EP created a committee, chaired by
former French President Valerie Giscard d'Estaing, to produce a
report on the principle of subsidiarity.3 ' The report explicitly
emphasized the importance of transferring powers to the ComMember States as part of
munity as well as retaining them in the
32
principle.
the
of
implementation
the
While the European Parliament's efforts were important in
sparking the relaunch of the European Community in the 1980s,
the Draft EUT was more a catalyst (though an important one)
for other reform efforts than a source of specific proposals for
action. 3 There was little governmental interest in the European
Parliament's approach of adopting a new, comprehensive constitutional document. The European Council of heads of state and
the European Commission did not initially seize upon the idea
of a general institutional reform, opting instead for the more
limited, but still ambitious, Single European Act34 ("SEA"). The
30. ALrIERo SPINEUJI, TowARDs THE EUROPEAN UNION 19 (1983) (emphasis added).
31. European Parliament, Interim Report on the Principle of Subsidiarity, Eur.
Parl. Doc. A3-163/90/Part B (1990) [hereinafter Interim Report].
32. Id. at 2.
33. See Sophie Vanhoonacker, The European Parliamentand EuropeanPoliticalUnion,
in THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE ON POLITICAL UNION 215 (Finn Laursen &
Sophie Vanhoonacker eds., 1992).
34. Id.
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principle of subsidiarity did enter the SEA, though not labelled
as such, in the provision governing the environment.3 5 Environmental policy was a specially sensitive area of overlapping national and transnational concerns, and subsidiarity principles
provided a useful way of approaching the boundary. Indeed, the
fundamental approach of the SEA, favoring mutual recognition
of national standards over uniform Community legislation in removing regulatory barriers to trade, is consistent with subsidiarity principles.3 6 Mutual recognition allows maximum flexibility to respond to local conditions and traditions while creating
a least common denominator to respond to cross-border concerns.3 7 Despite casting its shadow across the SEA, however, subsidiarity did not immediately assume a prominent role in the
wider European debate.
At this point, though, a new player entered. The President
of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, came away from a
meeting with representatives of the German Under convinced
that subsidiarity had a vital role to play in the European Community.38 His initial exposure to the problem, interestingly, was not
a question of the balance of power between the European Community and the Member States. Instead, the Lnder were concerned with the domestic principles of subsidiarity in German
federalism. Increased Community action was shifting power to
the central government through its control of the EC delegation, and the Lnder argued for an increased role in Community
decision-making to preserve their own power.3 9 Catholic social
theory was influential in Delors's thinking, and the German federalist principle thus fell on fertile ground.4" Subsidiarity promised to be an extremely useful concept: not only did it hold out
35. SEA, supra note 1, art. 130r(4) ("The Community shall take action relating to
the environment to the extent to which the objectives referred to in paragraph I can be
attained better at Community level than at the level of the individual Member States.");
see Koen Lenaerts, The Principleof Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European Union:
Keeping the Balance of Federalism, 17 FoRDHm Irr'L LJ. 846 (1994) (discussing subsidiarity's effects on environmental policy and comparing Article 130r with Article 3b).
36. Lenaerts, supra note 35, at 856-58; see Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 310 Final (June 1985) (explaining rationale underlying SEA).
37. Lenaerts, supra note 35, at 856-58.
38. Guenther F. Schaefer, InstitutionalChoices: The Rise and Fall of Subsidiarity, 23
FUTURES 681, 689 (1991).

39. Id.
40. Wilke & Wallace, supra note 14, at 30.
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the promise of a more smoothly integrated Europe, but it provided an obvious answer to critics who claimed that the EC was
excessively centralist.
It is perhaps fitting that the man who became subsidiarity's
chief champion was directly influenced by all of the idea's
sources: Catholic thought, German federalism, and the need for
an answer to critics of the EC's alleged centralizing tendencies.
It is this last point, however, that became most important in the
debate over subsidiarity.
II.

SUBSIDIARJTY AND MAASTRICHT

The momentum generated by the Single European Act
(better known as the "1992" initiative), the end of the Cold War,
and the rekindling of interest in EC institutional reform led to
intergovernmental conferences on political union and on economic and monetary union, conferences which culminated in
the Maastricht Treaty.41 Delors, in his role as Commission President, stressed in many European fora the role of subsidiarity in
balancing EC and national powers in order to allay fears of European overreaching, but did so most importantly in the intergovernmental conferences.42
In the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union,
the subsidiarity principle that Delors championed found its way
into formal governmental proposals for EC reform, as some
countries (most notably the UK and Denmark) resisted further
strengthening of the supranational power of the EC and required reassurance that the expansion of the EU would not undercut national societies.43 The end result was the inclusion of
the subsidiarity clause laid out above."
Subsidiarity provided useful cover to national politicians facing Euro-skeptical criticism of Maastricht at home. John Major,
for example, relied heavily on the principle in his statements on
the EC Treaty. 45 What began as a statement of principle of secondary importance, though, became much more prominent af41. MARTIN HoLLAmN, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INTEGRATION 73-88 (1993).
42. Wilke & Wallace, supra note 14, at 31.
43. See Finn Laursen et al., Overiew of the Negotiations, in THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
CONFERENCE ON POLITICAL UNION, supra note 33, at 3.
44. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

45. See, e.g., Nikki Knewstrub, Prime MinisterMajor Warns EC Against "Misjudgment'
GUARDIAN, Nov. 21, 1991, at 8.
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ter the Danish rejection of Maastricht. The failure of the Danish
referendum, the narrowness of French approval, and public
doubts about the Maastricht Treaty in other countries threw the
entire process into turmoil.4 6 Supporters of the EU seized upon
the subsidiarity principle and pressed it into service as a damage
control measure to reassure those suspicious of the growth of
EU power.4 7 Subsidiarity was presented as a primary safeguard
for the prerogatives of the nation-state.
The immediate challenge was to convert a vague statement
of principle into a convincing safeguard against European expansion.4" The European Commission delivered the first response with a report designed to clarify exactly what subsidiarity
meant and begin to put it into practice. The report emphasized
that "national powers are the rule and the Community's the exception" 9 and repeated the Commission's recognition that proposals for Community action required explicit justification in
terms of subsidiarity, justification that it undertook to provide in
writing with each new proposal.5 0 The caveat was that the principle of subsidiarity would not itself determine the areas in which
the EU was competent to act, as this was the job of the treaties.
Neither would it apply to the areas in which the EU has exclusive
jurisdiction, such as the removal of barriers to the internal market.5 1 Subsidiarity thus could not vest the EU with authority to
act where it had none, nor could it return authority to the Member States where the community had taken over entirely. Both
the level of detail and the implementation of EC regulations,
however, would be subject to the principle, leaving the maximum feasible freedom of action to the Member States. 52 The
Commission openly recognized that it was answering critics who
"conclude that there are no precise limits to intervention by the
Community, which stands accused of being able to meddle
where it pleases." 3 The Commission also undertook a separate
46. Anthony L. Teasdale, Subsidiarity in Post-MaastrichtEurope, 64 PoL.Q. 187, 19395 (1993).

47. Id.
48. Commission of the European Communities, The Subsidiarity Principle, 25 E.C.
BULL., no. 10, at 116 (1992).
49. Id. at 119.
50. I& at 117.

51. Id. at 119-20
52. Id. at 124-25; see Lenaerts, supra note 35, at 850-52.
53. The Subsidiarity Principle, supra note 48, at 119.
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review of existing legislation for conformity with the subsidiarity
principle, and presented the European Council with a list of initiatives to be withdrawn or modified in light of the analysis.54
Thus, the Commission staged a concrete demonstration of subsidiarity's constraining effect on Community legislation.
The European Council, for its part, used the Edinburgh
summit of December 1992 to welcome and expand upon the
Commission's efforts to give additional content to subsidiarity as
a response to the ratification crisis.55 It issued a detailed communique drawn up by the foreign ministers, specifying that all
EU institutions were to include principles of subsidiarity in their
policy analyses and giving the Court of Justice some role in overseeing the principle's interpretation and use.55 At the same
time, the communique carefully stated that the new principle
did not alter the powers allocated to the Community and its institutions, nor provide a rule of direct effect with which to mount
judicial challenges to legislation. 57 It also issued guidelines for
determining whether subsidiarity's requirements are met: 1) the
issue has significant transnational aspects; and/or 2) independent action by the Member States would damage a collateral
treaty goal (such as by distorting trade) or otherwise harm Member State interests; and/or 3) action at the EU level would produce clear benefits of scale or effectiveness as compared with
independent action.58 These conclusions are to be substantiated
by qualitative or quantitative analyses. As a procedural matter,
the Council declaration formalized consideration of subsidiarity
issues as an integral part of the EU legislative process.59
Subsidiarity thus made the transition from an obscure and
awkwardly named principle of social theory to a front-line
54. European Council, Conclusions of the December 11-12 Edinburgh Summit, pt.
A, annex 2 (1992), reprinted in RmEUTR EUR. COMMUNrIY REP. (Dec. 14, 1992).
55. Id.

56. Id.
57. Id. annex 1.
58. Id. Lenaerts makes the interesting observation that a careful parsing of the
language of article 3b does not support the use of efficiency as an independent basis for
Community action; rather, it seems to set up the absolute inability of Member States to
achieve the desired goal as a prerequisite. However, Lenaerts correctly notes that the
Council's interpretation is the general understanding, and argues that the text permits
such an interpretation if efficiency is understood as a substantive goal of the EU.
Lenaerts, supra note 35, at 876-79.
59. Conclusions of the December 11-12 Edinburgh Summit, supra note 54, annex
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weapon of the battle in defense of national identity. As the development of the idea outlined above shows, though, subsidiarity
is not one principle but many. While it is touted as the rule preserving national independence against supranational encroachment, it has also served as a fundamental principle of domestic
social organization and as a doctrine of the allocation of powers
that is very nearly neutral in deciding which powers belong
where. Despite the European institutions' attempts to solidify
subsidiarity's meaning, the slipperiness of the concept has fueled
skepticism about its real utility.
III.

CRITICISMS OF SUBSIDIARITY

The existing analysis of subsidiarity has largely been devoted
to explaining the concept and trying to outline the institutional
mechanisms and rules that might be used to put its theory into
practice. 60 In these analyses, there seems to be a general consensus that the principle is not well-defined at this point, and that it
is unclear as yet how much practical impact the rhetoric of subsidiarity will have on the practice of the EU. Current criticisms
of subsidiarity as the supposed savior of the European states have
centered on four major points: the multiple meanings of the
word, its incomplete application to EU institutions to date, the
difficulty of conducting the required analyses, and its unenforceability.
The first ground for criticism has already been laid out in
the discussion of the European Parliament's subsidiarity proposals. Subsidiarity means different things to different people; indeed, one commentator has gone so far as to call it "an empty
shell devoid of concrete substance.., a golden rule, a fashionable term, a concept with which anyone might agree in principle,
because all can define for themselves what it means in any specific case."6 1 Not all formulations of the principle show significant bias towards national action. More importantly, the analysis
of the level at which a policy may best be implemented is bound
60. See, e.g., Bermann, supra note 7; Emiliou, supra note 15; Trevor C. Hartley,
Constitutionaland InstitutionalAspects of the MaastrichtAgreement, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
213 (1993).
61. Schaefer, supra note 38, at 688; see Thomas C. Fischer, "Federalism"in the European Community and the United States: A Rose By Any Other Name, 17 FoPH~AM INT'L LJ.
389 (1994) (criticizing vagueness of principle); Teasdale, supra note 46, at 187 (criticizing vagueness of principle).
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to be highly subjective and can cut in favor of centralization as
well as against it.62 After all, a notion that Community action is
of some instrumental value is likely to underlie most decisions
other than those designed to create uniformity for its own sake.
The argument that subsidiarity can run in favor of centralization
as well as against it is borne out by the theological experience, in
which theorists argue that "it can and should be called into service as a no less necessary amber light to warn local communities
not to make authoritative decisions which affect the well-being of
the wider community."63

The slipperiness of subsidiarity also leads to widely varying
assessments of its novelty and importance. Some argue that subsidiarity is utterly inconsistent with the existing treaties, which
follow an all-or-nothing approach in their allocation of authority, and subsidiarity analysis will merely gum up the works if it
does anything.' Many of its proponents, on the other hand, argue that subsidiarity has been a fundamental principle underlying the EC from its inception 65 which makes the argument that
the principle is a-substantial new check on the expansion of EU
power a bit unconvincing, if not schizophrenic.
The second criticism is that subsidiarity is incompletely applied. As developed in the German federal tradition, subsidiarity
is primarily a doctrine of institutional design and allocation of
powers.6 6 The European Parliament used it in such a way in
drawing up a comprehensive division of powers in the draft
EUT. However, that vision was distorted in a Maastricht Treaty
that makes incremental adjustments to existing institutions instead, and excludes the principle of subsidiarity from consideration altogether in the question of when the EU or its Member
6
The explicit excluStates have authority to act in an area at allY.
question
fundamental
this
from
sion of subsidiarity principles
reduces subsidiarity to a prudential doctrine of legislative self62.
63.
(1992);
64.

Cass, supra note 20, at 1108-09.
Roger Greenacre, Subsidiarity in State and Church, 260 CONTEMP. REv. 287, 288
see Cass, supra note 20, at 1111-12.
A.G. Toth, The Principleof Subsidiarity in the MaastrichtTreaty, 29 COMMON MKT.

L. Rav. 1079, 1081 (1992).

65. Wilke & Wallace, supra note 14, at 36-37; Interim Report, supra note 31, at 3-4.
66. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (explaining role of subsidiarity in
German federalism).
67. Emiliou, supra note 15, at 392; Hartley, supra note 60, at 215-16; Toth, supra
note 64, at 1091.
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restraint and policy implementation rather than a real control
on the distribution of power.6 8
The third critique focuses on the complexity and difficulty
of applying subsidiarity even when its abstract meaning is clear.6 9
Subsidiarity requires an analysis of the comparative utility of EU
action, Member State action, and no action at all. Predicting the
outcome of a known policy is difficult enough, but trying to predict what action the Member States or the market would take in
the absence of EU action adds a virtually insurmountable layer
of difficulty to the task. Furthermore, the necessarily contextual
nature of the effectiveness analysis might lead to inconsistent results in different states; water quality standards at Mediterranean
beaches, for example, have greater cross-boundary effects based
on proximity and tourism than the very same standards on Scottish beaches.' 0 Finally, the various values that go into determining the optimal response could cut against each other. For example, the Member States and the EU might both be capable of
achieving a certain goal, but state action might require much
more complex and intrusive regulation. It is unclear how such
competing values could be quantified and traded off. There
could also be negative externalities to subsidiarity, such as overburdening local authorities or encouraging destructive regulatory competition, that must be taken into account. 1
The last criticism builds on the first and is both the most
common and the most vehement. Multiple commentators have
noted that the principle of subsidiarity is bound to be nonjusticiable. 2 The imprecision of its meaning, together with the difficulty of producing a definitive objective analysis of such a complex policy question as the "best" level of national action, means
that it is highly unlikely the principle can be meaningfully applied to stop expansionist exercises of power. The judgments
involved are inherently political and uncertain, and the European Court of Justice is ill-equipped to second-guess the policy
analyses of the other Community organs. Even if the Court of
Justice were to find the principle justiciable, its own biases have
been expansionist in the past and it seems unlikely to reverse
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Bermann, supra note 7, at 365-67.
Id. at 383-86.
Toth, supra note 64, at 1098.
Id.; Bermann, supra note 7, at 386-90, 451-53.
Bermann, supra note 7, at 395; Emiliou, supra note 15, at 402.
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many initiatives."' Some have made proposals for innovative
methods of binding subsidiarity review, such as a panel of distinguished former public servants with no duty other than to deliberate such questions. 74 A more common argument, however, is
that subsidiarity is bound to be nothing more than a "leitmotif,"
a political principle that may or may not be applied by the same
powers that now have decisional authority.'
These criticisms are significant, if not necessarily of decisive
importance. The EU can try to confine the multiple personalities of subsidiarity through careful definition, though ideas are
difficult to nail down. The incoherence of a partial application
of subsidiarity to avoid the question of institutional competencies could be corrected by raising questions of subsidiarity in institutional reform debates. Even a non-justiciable principle can
have important constraining effects on an institution, especially
when influential players (i.e., reluctant national governments
like those of the United Kingdom and Denmark) can use the
principle as rhetorical and normative ammunition to oppose
new initiatives without merely appearing obstructionist.
This is not to dismiss the existing criticisms, but it seems
that in focusing solely on difficulties in implementing the restrictive interpretation of subsidiarity they miss an important point.
Asking only whether subsidiarity will be meaningfully applied
overlooks a more fundamental question: whether the deep logic
of subsidiarity is in fact supportive of the nation-state, or instead
subtly corrosive to its very essence.
IV.

SOVEREIGNTY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The debate over subsidiarity and the proper scope of EU
action is often presented as a debate over national sovereignty,
most notably in the United Kingdom. Sovereignty is a difficult
concept to unpack, especially in the European Union. Before
proceeding further, however, it is necessary to define exactly
what those defending the nation-state from the expansion of EU
powers are trying to preserve. In the United Kingdom, at least,
the defenders themselves use "sovereignty" to describe the
73. Schaefer, supra note 38, at 690-93.
74. Teasdale, supra note 46, at 196-97.
75. Schaefer, supra note 38, at 693; see supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing justiciability).
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stakes.7 6
William Wallace distinguishes three main ideas entangled in
the contemporary European discourse of sovereignty. 77 First,
there is formal sovereignty, the legal supremacy of an authority's
decision over all other decisions purporting to apply to the same
polity. Second is effective sovereignty, the practical power to exercise the legal powers enjoyed in theory. Finally comes autonomy, the ability to achieve desired goals through the unilateral
exercise of rights. 78 Though the rhetoric of each strand of sovereignty plays some role, it is really the last two that are at the core
of the EU debate.
Let us turn first to formal sovereignty. The classical theory
of sovereignty, concerned almost exclusively with formal sovereignty rather than practical constraints on its exercise, admitted
of no possibility of division or limitation of sovereignty; the ruler
was answerable to God alone. Either an authority was sovereign
or it was not. Thus, Jean Bodin, the originator of classical notions of sovereignty, argued that attempts to divide the power of
the state were "egregious absurdities" and "contrary to the laws
and to natural reason,"79 and that "[slovereignty... is not limited either in power, or in function, or in length of time." 0 Similar notions can be found in Hobbes and Rousseau.8 1
Even as the notions of absolute power concentrated in one
sovereign gave way to theories of the separation of powers and
popular sovereignty, the central idea that there was no power
superior to that of the nation remained. In Revolutionary
France, for example, the primary argument used to overcome
the king's constitutional immunity from trial or punishment was
that the sovereignty of the nation's people was illimitable. 2 In
the United States, while internal power is divided vertically between the states and the federal government and horizontally
76. Wilke & Wallace, supra note 14, at 17; William Wallace, What PriceInterdependence? Sovereignty and Interdependence in British Politics, 62 INT'L A;. 367, 370-88 (1986).
77. Wallace, supra note 76, at 368-69.
78. Id.
79. JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY. FOUR CHAPTERs FROM THE Six BooKs OF THE
COMMONWEALTH 27, 104 (Julian H. Franklin trans. & ed., 1992).
80. Id. at 3; id. at 11 ("the prince is not subject to the law").
81. THOMAS HOBBES, LEATHAN 228-239 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968); JEANJACQUES RousSEAu, THE SOCIAL CoNTRAcT 69-78 (Maurice Cranston trans., 1968).

82. See, e.g., REGICIDE AND

REVOLUTION: SPEECHES AT THE

(Michael Walzer ed., 1974) (speech ofJean-Baptiste Maihle).

TRIAL OF Louis XVI 97-98
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between the branches of government, the Supreme Court has
held that the United States as a whole has all necessary powers in
its external relations as an inescapable consequence of its status
as a sovereign state.8 3
Paradoxes of overlapping sovereignty are nothing new in
federal societies, but it is very difficult to locate a single national
sovereign in a system of overlapping authority.8 4 Although federalism is a loaded word in the EU debate, if by federalism one
means "pluralistic democracy in which two sets of governments,
neither being fully at the mercy of the other, legislate and ad8
minister within their separate yet interlocked jurisdictions,"
then the EU clearly is a federal order. It is also questionable
whether the modern notion of sovereignty admits of no limitations on the authority of the nation, especially in democratic societies subscribing to liberal Western notions of human rights.8"
But if sovereignty no longer means that all power must lie in the
hands of one person or body, it is still used to draw boundaries
around communities within which the most fundamental powers
of ordering society lie and across which legal authority does not
pass. Indeed, one can make a strong argument that the primary
function of sovereignty in the global system today is to reify and
reinforce existing borders."7
If formal sovereignty is so understood, then it seems that EU
members have already ceded sovereignty in the formal sense. Indeed, it is common to speak, as the European Court of Justice
has, of limitations on national sovereignty or the pooling of sovereignty within the EU.88 The combination of the Court's doctrines of direct effect and supremacy means that EU law enters
the domestic legal order and trumps even later-enacted inconsis83. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317-19 (1936).
84. DANIELJ. ELEAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 90-91 (1987); PRESTON KING, FEDERALISM AND FEDERATION 133-41 (1982).
85. Ivo Duchacek, PeforatedSovereignties: Towards a Typology ofNew Actors in International Relations, in FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: CONFucr AND COOPERATION 1, 3 (HansJ. Michelmann & Panayotis Soldatos eds., 1990).
86. KING, supra note 84, at 141.
87. John Kincaid, Constituent Diplomacy in FederalPolities and the Nation-State, in FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: CONFLICT AND CO-OPERATION, supra note 85, at
54, 60-62.
88. See, e.g., Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlanse Administratie der Belastingen, Case
26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105; Robert 0. Keohane & Stanley Hoffman,
InstitutionalChange in Europe in the 1980s, in THE NEw EUROPEAN COMMUNrY. DECISIONMAKING AND INSTTUrrIONAL CHANGE, supra note 21, at 1, 13.
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tent national law, an intrusion into the domestic legal order far
beyond anything ordinarily found in international law governing
responsibility between states.8 9 It could be argued that Member
States retain the ultimate sanction of withdrawal from the EU,
however remote the possibility. ° While it is most likely true that
any state wishing to withdraw would be allowed to do so, such an
act would be so costly and disruptive as to resemble a secession
more than an ordinary exercise of legal authority-rather as if
Quebec decided to leave Canada.
Formal sovereignty is thus a thing of the past in the European Union. The Member States have all accepted a regime in
which the national government is no longer the supreme lawmaking authority within the state and national authorities can
find themselves without authority to act in the face of superior
Community law. The means of enforcement, of course, still lie
with national authorities, and a state can simply defy European
law. As a formal matter, though, such an act would be a violation of the accepted legal order. Despite frequent invocation of
the rhetoric of national parliamentary sovereignty, especially in
Britain, it is already gone in its absolute form.
However, effective sovereignty and autonomy are not all-ornothing concepts. European nations do still hold predominant
power, and though that power is no longer absolute, the question of when it operates in an unconstrained way is still critically
important. The issue over which states battle in the EU today is
not whether EU action can preempt national powers, but in
what areas the EU should do so. Frequently, the objections to
EU policies are rooted as much in their collateral effects on national identity and autonomy as in their nominal effects on the
legal regime.
Thus, national sovereignty in the EU has changed significantly. What the Member States are fighting to preserve using
the rhetoric of majesty and the illimitable power of a people is
really only relative freedom of action. The limits on sovereignty
in the EU go beyond the practical limitations on the power of
the state to achieve its goals that have always existed. The Mem89. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformationof Europe, 100 YALE LJ. 2403, 2413-22 (1991).
90. Some argue, though, that EC members have no formal right to withdraw without consent of membership, making the following secession analogy even more appropriate. See Williams, supra note 21, at 158.
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ber States have given up their trump card, their formal right to
have the last word on the legal order within their borders. As
Joseph Weiler cogently argues, they have compensated for this
loss in part by tightening intergovernmental control over the
EU.91 George Bermann, implicitly building on Weiler's analysis,
sees subsidiarity as an additional mechanism for defending national prerogatives developed in response to the new transfers 9of2
power to the EU in the Single European Act and Maastricht
However, the subsidiarity principle is precisely the wrong instrument for attempting to consolidate the position of Member
States in the long run.
V.

SUBSIDIARITY AND SUBVERSION

Subsidiarity, as the EU defines it, creates a presumption
against taking more powers away from the nation-state. Thus, in
the short run subsidiarity will protect Member State prerogatives. It also forecloses the possibility of a unitary and centralized
European state. In the longer term, though, the logic behind
subsidiarity will contribute to the erosion of effective sovereignty
and autonomy and undercut their remaining claims to the normative legacy of the classical theory of formal sovereignty: that
the authority of existing states is somehow a good in itself.
Other commentators have noted that in its most basic formulation-that powers should be allocated to the lowest level
that can most effectively carry out a particular function-subsidiarity can be used to justify further centralization of power as
well as its decentralization. 93 What is less well-noted is that the
logic of subsidiarity does not only run from the nation-state up
to the European Union. It also runs from the state down to subnational levels of society. Subsidiarity did not develop as a principle of international order, but of social and political organization within the state. Already some are starting to cite the principle against national governments to encourage devolution of national political authority.94 Nationalist movements within states
and supporters of a federal Europe based on local regions instead of the existing Member States have also begun to use prin91.
92.
93.
94.

Weiler, supra note 89, at 2410-31.
Bermann, supra note 7, at 348-65; see Lenaerts, supra note 35, at 851-52.
See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
Subsidiaity Begins at Home, EcoNoMisT, Aug. 8, 1992, at 46.
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ciples of subsidiarity to support their claims.95
If history is any guide, the decentralizing pressure on states
will only grow. Recall that the Catholic Church developed subsidiarity in part to protect itself and social groups affiliated with
it from the growing encroachment of state authority.9 6 Reformers seeking to decentralize the Church itself seized upon the
principle, though, beginning with the Vatican II reforms and
continuing through the Synod of Bishops today. 97 The debate
about subsidiarity in the Catholic Church now is a debate over
how power can flow away from the Vatican and towards local
church groups. 9
Subsidiarity, when fully understood, will thus put Member
States under pressure to yield power in both directions, to the
EU and to sub-national groups. Moreover, its ability to resist
these pressures will be seriously undercut by the vision of sovereignty implicit in the subsidiarity debate. Subsidiarity reduces
the question of sovereignty to one of efficiency. Without the
emotional and historical appeal of the classical vision of sovereignty, the state is reduced to a functional justification.
In the end, Monnet's vision of European federalism has
won out. It is common to characterize the grand institutional
question as one of supranationalism, in which EC institutions
make Europe-wide decisions, against intergovernmentalism,
where the Member States retain extensive powers and progress is
made through direct bargaining.9 9 Because subsidiarity places
obstacles in the way of excessive centralization, it appears to
favor intergovernmentalism as a normative principle. In fact, it
actually lies altogether outside the supranational/intergovernmental dichotomy. Subsidiarity is a check on centralization, but
95. Andrew Scott et al., Subsidiarity: A "Europeof the Regions" v. the British Constitution?, 32J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 47, 58-61 (1994); see Michael Keating, Introduction, in
REGIONS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNnIY 1, 5-6 (Michael Keating & Barry Jones eds.,
1985) (describing reliance of small nationalist movements on Community as realistic
framework for independence).
96. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
97. Franz-Xaver Kaufnann, The Principleof Subsidiarity Viewed by the Sociology of Organizations, 48JuRisT 275 (1988).
98. Komonchak, supra note 12, at 305-16.
99. See, e.g., HOLLAND, supra note 41, at 87-88; CHRISTOPHER TUGENDHAT, MAKNG
SENSE OF EUROPE 72-73 (1986); Andrew Moravcsik, Negotiatingthe SingleEuropean Act, in
THE Naw EUROPEAN COMMUNIT.

note 21, at 41.
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there is nothing in it favoring the nation-state as such other than
inertia. As a normative principle, it calls for the allocation of
authority to the lowest possible level consistent with purely technocratic criteria of policy success. As Monnet would have
hoped, the principle looks only to the logic of policy implementation and not to nationalist appeal. 100
In the long run, nation-states forced to fight on subsidiarity's field of functional efficiency must lose power. Not
only could subsidiarity justify transfers of power to both larger
and smaller units, but the logic of democracy and the logic of
the market imply that subsidiarity will call for such transfers.
The basic problem for the state is that there are few functions for which a mid-sized actor is most efficient. The logic of
the market, broadly construed, is that bigger is better. A larger
market, more fully integrated, is better for economic growth
than a smaller, segmented economy. Many other public functions benefit from economies of scale as well. A united Europe
has a greater voice in foreign affairs and a better ability to defend itself than a collection of squabbling countries. European
programs drawing on a common resource pool allow expensive
public projects like space exploration and high-technology research to proceed even if they would be beyond the capacity of
any single state. 101 The list of projects that can be better carried
out through joint action goes on, and provides the major impetus behind EU cooperation today. Moreover, the dynamic is selfreinforcing: the greater the interdependence of European
gains from
economies and societies, the greater the efficiency
02
joint action as transboundary effects increase.1
The logic of democracy, on the other hand, holds that the
100. Joel Trachtman shares this view of subsidiarity as an essentially functionalist
principle. SeeJoel P. Trachtman, L'Etat, CTst Nous: Sovereignty, Economic Integration and
Subsidiarity, 33 HARv.J. INT'L L. 459 (1992). Neofunctionalism is enjoying some revival

as an explanation of European integration after a long period of dormancy. See, e.g.,
David R. Cameron, The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences, in EuaoroLrrcs: INSrITUTIONS AND POUICYNAING INTHE "NEw" EUROPEAN COMMUNr1Y 23 (Alberta M. Sbragia
ed., 1992); Finn Laursen, Explainingthe Intergovernmental Conference on PoliticalUnion, in
Ti

INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE ON POLrICAL UNION, supra note 33, at 229;

David Mutimer, 1992 and the PoliticalIntegrationof Europe: NeofunctionalismReconsidered,
13 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 75 (1989).
101. H.W. Armstrong, Subsidiarity and the Operation of European Community Regional
Polity in Britain, 27 REGIONAL STUD. 575 (1993).
102. Id.
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nation-state is not the optimal unit for many of the remaining
functions. The notion that smaller polities allow greater democratic control over public policy is familiar to democratic theory.103 It may makes sense in some cases to accept some dilution
of democratic control to increase the capabilities of the polity.
In such a case, relative control is traded for absolute power.
However, if bigger is better-if localism is limited in its ability to
achieve public goals-why stop at the nation-state? Precisely
those issues of macroeconomic coordination and international
power that are usually cited as a strong justification for ceding
democratic control from the local community to the nation can
be even better achieved at the European level. For "soft" questions like education, culture, housing, and so forth, greater localism means greater flexibility and democracy; there is no reason
why such decisions need be taken on the national level.'" 4 Even
for such "mid-sized" problems as do exist, there is no guarantee
that national borders determined historically rather than functionally will coincide with the boundaries of the problem,
especially in densely-populated Europe. Sub-national "paradiplomacy" between adjacent local governments in different
countries is already an important evolving response to such regional problems.
Of course, the historical importance of nation-states will
leave them an important role. Especially in relatively homogeneous states, existing cultural and social ties create issues and
problems that are delimited by the existing borders. National
governments will most likely continue to be the best fora for
dealing with such issues. Moreover, subsidiarity is only a word.
Subjective emotional ties of identity play a critical role in the
constitution of communities, and these ties will not disappear
overnightjust because they no longer make sense under the prevailing formal justification of the distribution of power.
It is important to recognize, though, that subsidiarity does
not fill the role prescribed for it as the great defender of national sovereignty. In fact, the principle of subsidiarity itself exerts strong centrifugal pressure for the flow of power to European or regional institutions at the expense of the nation-state.
103. Weiler, supra note 89, at 2471.
104. Hans J. Michelmann, Conclusion, in FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: CONFLICr AND COOPERATION, supra note 85, at 299, 306-08.

1994]

SUBS1DIAR1TY AND SOVFJEGNTY

By taking the last elements of majesty out of the discussion of
sovereignty, subsidiarity leaves the European state with no distinctive claim to authority once the principle is turned on the
state itself. Inertia provides a negative justification for state authority if the presumption is against altering the status quo, and
cultural or historical ties may create a positive justification for
some powers at the level of the nation. The question is posed
most starkly, though, in federal states, where the European
Union can take over most of the functions of external sovereignty-such as foreign affairs, trade, and defense-that have
traditionally justified the federation. 10 5 Here the logic of subsidiarity may well mean the end of the traditional state. To put it
bluntly, why does a Basque need Spain in a united Europe?
CONCLUSION
Subsidiarity has been hurriedly pressed into service as the
"plug and play" institutional solution to perceived threats to national independence as European centralization progresses. In
one sense, the principle is up to the task; it does provide a coherent principle by which some powers but not others should be
allocated to European central authorities. However, just because subsidiarity provides a check on integration does not mean
that it is protective of national prerogatives. If in modem Europe national sovereignty has been reduced to the relative importance of national governments as decisionmaking arenas,
subsidiarity is in fact a further source of its erosion. An examination of the historical roots of the doctrine quickly reveals how
easily subsidiarity can be used to problematize the state itself and
increase rather than decrease the flow of power away from national capitals. Whatever political purposes subsidiarity may
serve in the short run, the long-run institutional implications of
this particular quick fix may be just the opposite of those intended by champions of the European state.
If the primary objection European publics have to the
growth of the European Union is emotional rather than functional, a rather different prescription emerges. The problem is
not merely one of institutional design, to be solved with more or
better rules. It is also the technocratic world view, of which sub105. See Duchacek, supra note 85, at 4-5 (noting typical characteristics of federal
constitutions).
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sidiarity is a product. Principles of efficiency simply do not address the emotional questions of identity and trust-misfiled
under the label of "sovereignty"-that seem to underlie public
alienation from the EU. Those who wish to preserve national
identity in the European Union to come would do better to focus on mobilizing and engaging public opinion than on adjusting the institutions and cajoling the elites. Only through the
process of public involvement and consensus can a stable new
European identity be formed. 06 As it is, the champions of national identity have embraced a solution proposed by the technocrats, and the two groups may eventually find that they have
been talking past one another.

106. See Marquardt, supra note 4 (offering more complete discussion of importance of deliberate political mobilization to forge new European identity).

